The Superb Korean War ‘Battle of the Imjin River Hill 314’ M.M. group of seven awarded to Sergeant S. Robinson, 4 Platoon, “B” Company, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment (‘The Glorious Glosters’), who, although seriously wounded, personally kept his four Bren Machine-Guns in action in an exposed forward position for over three hours, decimating multiple Chinese ‘Human Wave’ attacks until he collapsed over his own Bren due to loss of blood. Originally recommended for a D.C.M., his award was downgraded as the War Office authorised just two D.C.M.s and six M.M.s to the Glosters’ other ranks, despite their heroic stand which blunted and ruined Mao’s Spring Offensive Military Medal, E.II.R., 1st issue (1444977 A/Sjt. S. Robinson, Glosters); 1939-45 Star; France and Germany Star; Defence and War Medals 1939-45; Korea 1950-53, 1st issue (1444977 Cpl. S. Robinson, Glosters); U.N. Korea 1950-54, unnamed as issued; together with the recipient’s United States of America Presidential Unit Citation riband bar, nearly extremely fine (7) £20,000-£30,000 --- M.M. London Gazette 8 December 1953. The original recommendation, for the award of a Distinguished Conduct Medal, was written by his C.O., Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Carne, V.C., D.S.O. and states: ‘Choksong, River Imjin, South Korea 22-25 April 1951 - Rifle Platoon Sergeant. During the night of 23-24 April, particularly during the early morning of the 24th April, repeated attacks were made by heavy Chinese forces against Sergeant Robinson’s platoon position. At first light, he was manning a light machine-gun in an exposed forward position. Despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, he maintained this gun in action personally for over three hours though wounded seriously in the arm and later, the leg. At the end of this time, through loss of blood, he collapsed over the weapon and only then was drawn to the rear. Due to his courage and selfless devotion to duty, this important post withstood the repeated assaults of the enemy until the order was given to withdraw to a new position. Sergeant Robinson’s conduct was indeed an inspiration to all those about him.’ Stanley Robinson was born in Chatham, Kent on 20 July 1920, joined the regular army and saw service in North West Europe during the Second World War. As a regular reservist, he was mobilised at Colchester in August 1950 for service in Korea with the Gloucestershire Regiment as a Corporal in “B” Company. The 1st Battalion of the Glosters sailed aboard the Empire Windrush, arrived in Pusan harbour on 10 November 1950, made its way to the front line north of Pyongyang, but was soon swept up in the retreat of the UN forces in the face of vast numbers of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers pushing down from the north. In February 1951 the U.N. forces went onto the offensive, recapturing Seoul and pushing up to and beyond the 38th Parallel, which had been the border between the North and the South. Robinson was promoted in the field from Corporal to be Platoon Sergeant of Lieutenant Geoffrey Costello’s No. 4 Platoon, “B” Company. The Glosters were deployed on the U.N. front line along the Imjin River when the Chinese Spring Offensive opened on the evening of 22 April 1951. The Glosters’ position covered a classic invasion route from the north, as Seoul was just thirty miles away to the south. Furthermore, it formed a pivot in the Allied line, which abruptly changed direction from west-east by suddenly running due north. The 29th Independent British Brigade had been allocated twelve miles of west-east-north front, comprising steep hills intersected by deep valleys. It was impossible to man a continuous defensive line, so Brigadier Brodie decided to deploy each of his infantry battalions on separate areas of key high ground, relying on his artillery and tanks to cover the wide gaps between them, including the dominating 675m-high feature called Kamak San. Ominously, there was a very wide gap between the Glosters to the west of the Brigade area and the other three battalions who were safeguarding the main north-south highway (Route 11) to the east. Like his Brigadier, Lieutenant Colonel Carne, commanding 1st Glosters, appreciated that in order to hold vital ground he could not concentrate his infantry companies. Defence stores such as wire and anti-personnel mines were in short supply and the Glosters’ company positions were not as secure as he wanted them to be. Carne’s main objective was to cover the approaches to the defile and track running south through the hills which offered the fastest way to reach flatter country around Seoul. Ideally Carne wanted to occupy Kamak San, but his manpower was insufficient to do so. He placed “A” Company on Castle Hill, which covered the main crossing point along the Imjin River about 2,000 yards to the north, and “B” Company on its right flank to cover the two-mile gap between the Glosters and the next British battalion. The other companies were in depth or reserve positions. The entire Chinese 63rd Army (about 27,000 fighters) was tasked to wipe out one British Infantry Brigade. During the morning of Sunday April 22, warnings were received of large-scale enemy movement north of the river, and 1 Glosters prepared for battle. Extra ammunition was bought up and distributed to the companies and both “A” and “B” Companies sent out fighting patrols closer to the river. Artillery and mortar targets were registered and recorded. All companies were placed at 50% stand-to. The First Night and Day of the Battle After dark on April 22, swarms of Chinese troops crossed the Imjin, taking massive casualties from artillery and small-arms fire aided by mortar flares. Undaunted by their losses, they pressed on, infiltrating along the gaps between the various British positions. The Gloster fighting patrols were withdrawn at midnight as their ammunition was expended. During the night of 22/23 April 1951, “B” Company inflicted crushing casualties on Chinese units which attempted to overrun their slit tranches, suffering no losses themselves. However, “A” Company was outnumbered by at least six to one, and after bitter fighting the Chinese established themselves in a captured allied bunker on the top of Castle Hill. Soon after dawn on 23 April the “A” Company Commander and many of his officers were killed and the survivors were in imminent danger of being overrun. Colonel Carne was forced to pull back to his depth positions. At 0830 “A” Company - now reduced to only one officer and 53 men - joined him on Gloster Hill, while “B” Company fell back 1,500 yards to destroy the Chinese troops on top of Hill 314 and occupy it. But to their right they could see hundreds of Chinese moving around their flank towards Kamak San. Unfortunately, no air support was available. The redeployed companies - “B” on Hill 314 and the rest of the battalion on Gloster Hill - could still deny the enemy use of the vital track from the village of Solma-Ri through the hills, and the British artillery and mortars were decimating the Chinese throughout the day, but Carne was well aware that both flanks of his battalion had been turned and unless he was provided with air strikes and tank support his sole options were to surrender or to fight on until his ammunition, water and food ran out. No relief or reinforcement could occur without other U.N. units fighting their way forward. By 10.30 on 23 April, “B” Company had taken the summit of Hill 314 and were preparing their defences. During that day the Chinese 188th and 189th Divisions got ready for a fresh att...
