International Autograph Auctions Europe S.L.
Los 1243
LIDDELL HART B. H.: (1895-1970) British soldier, military historian and military theorist. A World War II date T.L.S., B H Liddell Hart, one page, 4to, Ambleside, Westmorland, 21st April 1942, to Captain Humphrey ´Hugh´ Slater. Liddell Hart thanks his correspondent for their letter, although wishes that it had arrived a day earlier ´as I should have wired you to come over´ and hoping that he will still be in the area in a couple of weeks as ´I should greatly like to see you and have a talk´. Liddell Hart continues ´I read the memorandum with the greatest interest, and with almost complete agreement. Unfortunately, I have so much urgent work on hand that I cannot make as full notes upon it as I should wish, and as its importance deserves. But I have made the time to send you some ´enclosed herewith´ and in a postscript further writes ´I am sorry these notes are not more helpful - but as you will see, I agree so much with your thesis that I have little criticism to offer, and could only supplement it on matters of detail´. Together with the typed manuscript (unsigned) referred to, entitled Notes on Slater Memorandum, four pages, folio, n.p. (Westmorland), 21st April 1942. Liddell Hart´s manuscript relates to the strategies for winning World War II and states, in part, ´When you say that, in contrast to the last war, the attacker has an advantage over the defender, I think you ought to remember that in all the successful offensives of this war the attacker has hitherto enjoyed assets that fulfilled the conditions of successful attack - as specified before the war. Those conditions were (a) a superiority of something like 3 to 1 in modern weapon-power; or (b) a wide enough front to allow room for manoeuvre threatening to the defender´s rear; or (c) where the defender lacked air support; or (d) where the attacker displayed a great superiority of art[illery]; or (e) where the defender´s morale was already low. Such cases as Tobruk and Batan do not bear out the common idea that the attack has an inherent advantage over the defence pari passu. And the campaign in Russia, despite the wideness of the front, has been bringing that view more and more into question. The conclusion from this is the same as the conclusion I drew in the years following the last war - that to have an adequate prospect of successful attack we must develop a technique much superior to the existing one......I am particularly interested in your criticism of Field Service Regulations (1935) - which were written by Wavell......He sent me his draft for criticism - and we had some stimulating discussion and correspondence......In the outcome, the manual thus produced was a big improvement on its predecessors, though it did not go far enough in the direction of surprise, manoeuvre and mobility to satisfy me. In particular, I felt that it emphasised the new ideas in too hesitant a way and allowed a dangerous latitude to the conventionally-minded to adhere to their old practices......Personally, I should add two more to the five essential qualities that troops require for success in battle - rusiness (instinct for surpries) and adaptability (whic includes, but is more comprehensive than, flexibility). These never receive enough emphasis, or cultivation.......I have had a good deal of evidence as to the extent to which the morale of the German Army has been improved by the new way in which officers and other ranks mix and talk together when off-duty. The German Army has also solved the saluting problem, as you may know, by making it customary for the rank and file to salute each other - thus emphasising that the salute is a sign of the free-masonry of arms instead of a token of subservience. At the same time, I rather doubt whether British soldiers have the same fondness for these constant "gestures"........´. Some light age wear and a few minor paperclip rust stains, G to about VG, 2
