The Second Afghan War medal awarded to Lieutenant M. B. Salmon, West India Regiment, attache...

The Second Afghan War medal awarded to Lieutenant M. B. Salmon, West India Regiment, attached 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob’s Rifles), who distinguished himself at the battle of Maiwand and was recommended for the Victoria Cross for gallantry at Kandahar

Afghanistan 1878-80, no clasp (Lt. M. B. Salmon. 30th Bo. N.I.) fitted with a contemporary silver riband buckle, a few minor nicks, otherwise good very fine £4,000-£5,000 --- Provenance: A Collection of Medals for the Second Afghan War 1878-80, Dix Noonan Webb, May 2019. Mordaunt Broome Salmon was born in Bombay on 17 October 1853, the son of Lieutenant-General William Broome Salmon, Bombay Staff Corps and Sarah (née Welsh). He was commissioned on 19 August 1874, as Sub Lieutenant in the 2nd West India Regiment, joining them in Jamaica, where he remained until 1876.

On 19 August 1876, he was promoted to Lieutenant and transferred to the Bombay Staff Corps on attachment to the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob’s Rifles). From Quetta, in April 1880, he marched with the left wing of Jacob’s Rifles to Kandahar, where initially he commanded detachments on the Kandahar-Charman road, following the tribal attacks on the posts at Gatai and Dubbrai. But, on 5 July, he left with Jacob’s Rifles as part of the Girishk Field Force - a Brigade comprising E/B Battery R.H.A., 3rd Scinde Horse, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, H.Ms. 66th Foot, 1st Bombay Grenadiers and 30th Jacob’s Rifles - which was to support the Wali of Kandahar’s troops in halting the advance from Herat of Ayub Khan, a pretender to the Afghan throne.

Salmon commanded a company of Jacob’s Rifles during the skirmish on 14 July, which resulted in the capture of Wali Sher Ali’s guns from the enemy, and also in defending the baggage train along the Mundebad ravine at the Battle of Maiwand on 27 July 1880. When, at one stage, the baggage train was hard pressed by Afghan tribesmen advancing up the ravine, Salmon’s company counter-attacked with a detachment of Grenadiers, forcing the enemy back to the nearby village of Khig. Under orders to remain close to the baggage train, however, Salmon was unable to deploy his men to best advantage. He later recalled ‘…indeed, it was almost a certainty of being hit if any one got up from the ground and moved from place to place. Seeing this, the enemy became even bolder, and we were compelled to repel two very determined attacks which were made on the baggage later on.’

In the face of an overwhelming opposition and the whole force in disarray, Salmon’s company was forced to join the fighting retreat to Kandahar. The next morning, ten miles from the city, the column arrived at the Arghandab River, where five of the smooth-bore guns, ‘which had never been properly horsed or manned’, had to be abandoned. Salmon’s small group was crossing the river where one of the smooth-bores was abandoned and determined to save it. He succeeded in bringing the gun into Kandahar - the only smooth-bore to return.

Many accounts were written and official reports were required to be furnished by officers present at the military disaster of Maiwand, for there followed the usual inquest and enquiry following this defeat. Lieutenant Salmon was amongst a number of officers who wrote his personal account of the action:
‘At Khushk-i-Nakhud, on the night of the 26th July 1880, at about 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., the brigade received orders to march at 6:00 a.m. the following morning on the village of Maiwand, situated some ten miles distant in a northerly direction. Accordingly, on the morning of the 27th, the “rouse” sounded at 4:00 a.m., and the brigade marched off the camping ground at about 6:00 a.m.
The formation of the brigade was in line of columns at deploying interval, with the 66th on the right, Jacob’s Rifles in the centre, and the 1st Bombay Grenadiers on the left, with an advance guard consisting of two guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, and some cavalry; also a rear guard of a few smooth-bore guns, captured from Shere Ali Khan’s rebellious army, and some cavalry under Colonel Malcolmson, 3rd Sind Horse. The whole of the baggage was massed on the right of the brigade, and marched in that position.
The march commenced, as I have said, at about 6:00 a.m., in the direction of Maiwand; and after it had continued for about three hours or thereabouts, some objects were sighted in the distance on our left flank. At first we were completely in doubt as to what they were, but after careful observation it became apparent that these were very large bodies of the enemy moving in a direction at right angles to our own line of march, and I may say in a direction from west to east, heading for the same village of Maiwand to which we were bound. To the best of my belief, a party consisting of two guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, and a troop of the 3rd Sind Horse were sent to reconnoitre the enemy and send information to the Brigadier-General in command as to their strength and general disposition, and that after a lapse of a short time a note was received from the officer commanding the cavalry party that the enemy were in great force and strong both in cavalry and artillery, a fact which was very substantially corroborated by subsequent events.
The officer commanding was pleased to give an order for the line of battalions to change their front “half-left”, and advance in very much their former position over a small nallah which separated us from the enemy, and to move on for a considerable distance over a bare and stony plateau, on the extremity of which the enemy's hordes could now be seen drawn up in line to receive our attack.
I may mention here that the engagement was opened by Lieutenant MacLaine of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, with two guns, which he had taken a considerable distance in advance of the fighting line, and opened fire on the advancing enemy with admirable effect; but as to whether the movement was undertaken on that officer's own responsibility, or according to orders he received, I am not in a position to state. The time when the first shot was fired was, to the best of my belief, 9:45 a.m. (and not 11:00 a.m. as I have seen frequently stated in various accounts which I have read in the different papers), as I, to the best of my recollection, looked at my watch when the first gun was fired; and from that have fixed the hour. Lieutenant MacLaine was allowed to continue his firing for nearly half an hour before the enemy deigned to give any reply; but my idea is, that they were not by any means prepared for such an attack, and it took them some time to get their numerous pieces of artillery into the position they desired.
However, the fighting line was advanced some 700 yards along this plateau and was disposed, to the best of my belief, as follows - viz., the 66th on the right and Jacob's Rifles in the centre; at first only one wing was in the line, but subsequently the other wing was also brought up, and two companies detached from the regiment to prolong the line to the left of the Grenadiers, who were on the extreme left of the line. The greater part of the artillery was doing the first part of the action, on the right, and also some of the cavalry, the remainder being disposed of on the left rear of the line, and some with the baggage-guard.
What occurred at the fighting line subsequent to the position they ultimately took up I am unable to state, as I was on baggage-guard that day, and it was my fate to remain behind at a distance of some six or seven hundred yards with the baggage, which was massed about the nallah crossed by the line in their advance. Some of the baggage remained on the far side; some was in the nallah itself, and a portion of it had come across the nallah and ad...