65
ABBASID, AL-MUSTA‘SIM (640-656h). Dinar, Madinat al-Salam 656h. WEIGHT: 8.37g. REFERENCES: Treasures
Description
ABBASID, AL-MUSTA‘SIM (640-656h). Dinar, Madinat al-Salam 656h. WEIGHT: 8.37g. REFERENCES: Treasures of Islam 437; Miles, RIC 219. CONDITION: On a slightly ragged flan, some weak striking but almost extremely fine for issue with unit and decade of date extremely clear, excessively rare. THE LAST ABBASID DINAR STRUCK IN BAGHDAD. Al-Musta‘sim became caliph in 640h and proved to be an ineffectual and weak ruler, surrounded by advisers who also disagreed among themselves. Unfortunately for the Islamic world, he was particularly ill-qualified to deal with perhaps the greatest threat the Abbasid caliphate had ever faced: the arrival of the Mongols under Hulagu. Mongol raiding parties had reached parts of Iraq during the early decades of the 7/13th century, on occasion possibly penetrating as far as Baghdad itself. It seems that the caliphs had begun sending annual tribute to the Mongol Great Khan under al-Mustansir (623-640h), but there were still at least occasional Abbasid victories over Mongol raids and early in his reign al-Musta‘sim had felt able to refuse an order from the short-lived Mongol ruler Güyük Khan to leave Baghdad and submit to him personally in Karakorum. But in 655h Möngke, the Great Khan, resolved to establish firm control over several Islamic states, including the Caliphate, and dispatched his brother Hulagu at the head of a huge army to carry out this plan. Although Möngke had no specific plans to overthrow the caliph, he ordered Hulagu to destroy Baghdad and kill al-Musta‘sim if the latter failed to meet his demands: these being personal submission to Hulagu, and agreeing to supply a detachment of troops to fight in the Mongol army. Hulagu left Hamadhan for Baghdad on 10 Ramadan 655h. The city was particularly ill-prepared to resist him, having suffered a major flood during the previous year causing unrest which had proved beyond beyond the caliph’s authority to quell. Nevertheless, on receiving Möngke’s message demanding his surrender, al-Musta‘sim not only refused but did so in a manner which so infuriated Hulagu that he broke off any further negotiations. Even worse, al-Musta‘sim seems to have made little effort to strengthen the city’s defences, nor did he seek aid from the other major Muslim states. He may have believed that they would rush to defend the home of the caliphate without being asked, but it is also possible that his authority was now so weak that they would not have obeyed him in any event. To complicate matters further the caliph’s wazir, Ibn Alqami, certainly downplayed the Mongol threat when advising his master. Whether this was through incompetence, treachery, or both is difficult to say, although Ibn Alqami managed to become governor of Baghdad after al-Musta‘sim’s death. A Shi‘ite, he was rumoured to have colluded with the famous scientist and philosopher al-Tusi, also a Shi‘ite, whom Hulagu had taken prisoner the previous year when he subdued the Isma‘ili fortress of Alamut. Al-Tusi was entrusted with conducting some of the negotiations between Hulagu and al-Musta‘sim, and when these failed gave his Mongol master advice on the most astrologically propitious timing of the final assault. By the last days of 655h Hulagu’s vast army was beginning to encircle Baghdad. Finally showing a degree of initiative, al-Musta‘sim sent out a force of 20,000 cavalry but was comprehensively defeated, with Mongol engineers cutting off their escape by flooding the countryside behind them. A little over two weeks later the siege of Baghdad began on 14 Muharram 656h, with the Mongols using a variety of siege-engines against the city walls. A week later they had already made significant inroads against the city’s defences. Far too late, al-Musta‘sim tried to negotiate. Hulagu refused, and five days later the city surrendered. A week of looting and destruction, described in lurid detail by our historical sources, began on the final day of Muharram. Conservative modern estimates suggest that 100,000 people may have died in the destruction; others place the figure much higher. It was said at the time that the Tigris ran black with the ink from the books thrown into the river, and red from the blood of the slain. Al-Musta‘sim himself was captured alive, and forced to watch the destruction of his city before finally being executed on 14 Safar of that year. One well-known version relates that the caliph was killed rolled in a carpet and trampled to death by horsemen, allegedly because the Mongols considered it a mark of respect to kill a captive without spilling their blood. Another, reported by Marco Polo, claims that the Mongols locked the caliph in a room with the gold he might have used to buy his city’s safety, and left him to die of hunger and thirst. More intriguing, and less well known, is a version which once again features the philosopher al-Tusi. Hulagu, it is said, was excessively superstitious, and had heard from another astrologer that great disasters would come to pass if the Abbasid caliph was killed. Al-Tusi dismissed this as nonsense, and suggested that the caliph be wrapped in a carpet and rolled around the floor until he eventually died. This, he explained, would allow Hulagu to call off the execution if any dread portents should appear. Apparently satisfied by this unconventional piece of experimental philosophy, Hulagu agreed – and the unfortunate al-Musta‘sim duly met his end in this way. Discussing this extremely rare issue in RIC, Miles wrote: ‘I am aware of only one other specimen of this last of ‘Abbasid coins. It must have been struck in the first six weeks of the year, for al-Musta‘sim was put to death and the ‘Abbasid empire brought to an end by the Mongol Hulagu on the 14thof Safar, 656.’ Given the circumstances in Baghdad at the time, however, it seems most unlikely that the mint could have been active during the first two weeks of Safar, and these extremely rare dinars were probably struck during the four weeks of Muharram while the Mongols were camped around the city walls. The present coin is thus an extremely rare survivor of these events, escaping the destruction which befell so much else in the ruin of Baghdad.
Auction Details
Shipping
T&Cs & Important Info
Ask seller a question
ABBASID, AL-MUSTA‘SIM (640-656h). Dinar, Madinat al-Salam 656h. WEIGHT: 8.37g. REFERENCES: Treasures of Islam 437; Miles, RIC 219. CONDITION: On a slightly ragged flan, some weak striking but almost extremely fine for issue with unit and decade of date extremely clear, excessively rare. THE LAST ABBASID DINAR STRUCK IN BAGHDAD. Al-Musta‘sim became caliph in 640h and proved to be an ineffectual and weak ruler, surrounded by advisers who also disagreed among themselves. Unfortunately for the Islamic world, he was particularly ill-qualified to deal with perhaps the greatest threat the Abbasid caliphate had ever faced: the arrival of the Mongols under Hulagu. Mongol raiding parties had reached parts of Iraq during the early decades of the 7/13th century, on occasion possibly penetrating as far as Baghdad itself. It seems that the caliphs had begun sending annual tribute to the Mongol Great Khan under al-Mustansir (623-640h), but there were still at least occasional Abbasid victories over Mongol raids and early in his reign al-Musta‘sim had felt able to refuse an order from the short-lived Mongol ruler Güyük Khan to leave Baghdad and submit to him personally in Karakorum. But in 655h Möngke, the Great Khan, resolved to establish firm control over several Islamic states, including the Caliphate, and dispatched his brother Hulagu at the head of a huge army to carry out this plan. Although Möngke had no specific plans to overthrow the caliph, he ordered Hulagu to destroy Baghdad and kill al-Musta‘sim if the latter failed to meet his demands: these being personal submission to Hulagu, and agreeing to supply a detachment of troops to fight in the Mongol army. Hulagu left Hamadhan for Baghdad on 10 Ramadan 655h. The city was particularly ill-prepared to resist him, having suffered a major flood during the previous year causing unrest which had proved beyond beyond the caliph’s authority to quell. Nevertheless, on receiving Möngke’s message demanding his surrender, al-Musta‘sim not only refused but did so in a manner which so infuriated Hulagu that he broke off any further negotiations. Even worse, al-Musta‘sim seems to have made little effort to strengthen the city’s defences, nor did he seek aid from the other major Muslim states. He may have believed that they would rush to defend the home of the caliphate without being asked, but it is also possible that his authority was now so weak that they would not have obeyed him in any event. To complicate matters further the caliph’s wazir, Ibn Alqami, certainly downplayed the Mongol threat when advising his master. Whether this was through incompetence, treachery, or both is difficult to say, although Ibn Alqami managed to become governor of Baghdad after al-Musta‘sim’s death. A Shi‘ite, he was rumoured to have colluded with the famous scientist and philosopher al-Tusi, also a Shi‘ite, whom Hulagu had taken prisoner the previous year when he subdued the Isma‘ili fortress of Alamut. Al-Tusi was entrusted with conducting some of the negotiations between Hulagu and al-Musta‘sim, and when these failed gave his Mongol master advice on the most astrologically propitious timing of the final assault. By the last days of 655h Hulagu’s vast army was beginning to encircle Baghdad. Finally showing a degree of initiative, al-Musta‘sim sent out a force of 20,000 cavalry but was comprehensively defeated, with Mongol engineers cutting off their escape by flooding the countryside behind them. A little over two weeks later the siege of Baghdad began on 14 Muharram 656h, with the Mongols using a variety of siege-engines against the city walls. A week later they had already made significant inroads against the city’s defences. Far too late, al-Musta‘sim tried to negotiate. Hulagu refused, and five days later the city surrendered. A week of looting and destruction, described in lurid detail by our historical sources, began on the final day of Muharram. Conservative modern estimates suggest that 100,000 people may have died in the destruction; others place the figure much higher. It was said at the time that the Tigris ran black with the ink from the books thrown into the river, and red from the blood of the slain. Al-Musta‘sim himself was captured alive, and forced to watch the destruction of his city before finally being executed on 14 Safar of that year. One well-known version relates that the caliph was killed rolled in a carpet and trampled to death by horsemen, allegedly because the Mongols considered it a mark of respect to kill a captive without spilling their blood. Another, reported by Marco Polo, claims that the Mongols locked the caliph in a room with the gold he might have used to buy his city’s safety, and left him to die of hunger and thirst. More intriguing, and less well known, is a version which once again features the philosopher al-Tusi. Hulagu, it is said, was excessively superstitious, and had heard from another astrologer that great disasters would come to pass if the Abbasid caliph was killed. Al-Tusi dismissed this as nonsense, and suggested that the caliph be wrapped in a carpet and rolled around the floor until he eventually died. This, he explained, would allow Hulagu to call off the execution if any dread portents should appear. Apparently satisfied by this unconventional piece of experimental philosophy, Hulagu agreed – and the unfortunate al-Musta‘sim duly met his end in this way. Discussing this extremely rare issue in RIC, Miles wrote: ‘I am aware of only one other specimen of this last of ‘Abbasid coins. It must have been struck in the first six weeks of the year, for al-Musta‘sim was put to death and the ‘Abbasid empire brought to an end by the Mongol Hulagu on the 14thof Safar, 656.’ Given the circumstances in Baghdad at the time, however, it seems most unlikely that the mint could have been active during the first two weeks of Safar, and these extremely rare dinars were probably struck during the four weeks of Muharram while the Mongols were camped around the city walls. The present coin is thus an extremely rare survivor of these events, escaping the destruction which befell so much else in the ruin of Baghdad.
Important Coins of the Islamic World
Sale Date(s)
Lots: 1-124
Lots: 125-357
Venue Address
Sotheby's, The Upper Grosvenor Gallery
34-35 New Bond Street
London
W1A 2AA
United Kingdom
For Morton & Eden Ltd. delivery information please telephone +44 (0)20 7493 5344.
Important Information
Auction venue:
Sotheby's, in the Upper Grosvenor Gallery
The Aeolian Hall, Bloomfield Place
London W1A 2AA
Public viewing at:
Nash House
St George Street
London W1S 2FQ
Terms & Conditions
Conditions of Business for Buyers
1. Introduction
(a) The contractual relationship of Morton & Eden Ltd. and Sellers with prospective Buyers is governed by:-
(i) these Conditions of Business for Buyers;
(ii) the Conditions of Business for Sellers displayed in the saleroom and available from Morton & Eden Ltd.; (iii) Morton & Eden Ltd.’s Authenticity Guarantee;
(iv) any additional notices and terms printed in the sale catalogue, in each case as amended by any saleroom notice or auctioneer's announcement.
(b) As auctioneer, Morton & Eden Ltd. acts as agent for the Seller. Occasionally, Morton & Eden Ltd. may own or have a financial interest in a lot.
2. Definitions "Bidder" is any person making, attempting or considering making a bid, including Buyers;
"Buyer" is the person who makes the highest bid or offer accepted by the auctioneer, including a Buyer’s principal when bidding as agent;
"Seller" is the person offering a lot for sale, including their agent, or executors;
“M&E” means Morton & Eden Ltd., auctioneers, 45 Maddox Street, London W1S 2PE, company number 4198353.
"Buyer’s Expenses" are any costs or expenses due to Morton & Eden Ltd. from the Buyer; "Buyer’s Premium" is the commission payable by the Buyer on the Hammer Price at the rates set out in the Important Information for Buyers;
"Hammer Price" is the highest bid for the Property accepted by the auctioneer at the auction or the post auction sale price;
"Purchase Price" is the Hammer Price plus applicable Buyer’s Premium and Buyer’s Expenses;
"Reserve Price" (where applicable) is the minimum Hammer Price at which the Seller has agreed to sell a lot.
The Buyer’s Premium, Buyer’s Expenses and Hammer Price are subject to VAT, where applicable.
3. Examination of Lots (a) M&E’s knowledge of lots is partly dependent on information provided by the Seller and M&E is unable to exercise exhaustive due diligence on each lot. Each lot is available for examination before sale. Bidders are responsible for carrying out examinations and research before sale to satisfy themselves over the condition of lots and accuracy of descriptions.
(b) All oral and/or written information provided to Bidders relating to lots, including descriptions in the catalogue, condition reports or elsewhere are statements of M&E’s opinion and not representations of fact. Estimates may not be relied on as a prediction of the selling price or value of the lot and may be revised from time to time at M&E’s absolute discretion.
4. Exclusions and limitations of liability to Buyers
(a) M&E shall refund the Purchase Price to the Buyer in circumstances where it deems that the lot is a Counterfeit, subject to the terms of M&E’s Authenticity Guarantee.
(b) Subject to Condition 4(a), neither M&E nor the Seller:-
(i) is liable for any errors or omissions in any oral or written information provided to Bidders by M&E, whether negligent or otherwise;
(ii) gives any guarantee or warranty to Bidders and any implied warranties and conditions are excluded (save in so far as such obligations cannot be excluded by English law), other than the express warranties given by the Seller to the Buyer (for which the Seller is solely responsible) under the Conditions of Business for Sellers;
(iii) accepts responsibility to Bidders for acts or omissions (whether negligent or otherwise) by M&E in connection with the conduct of auctions or for any matter relating to the sale of any lot.
(c) Without prejudice to Condition 4(b), any claim against M&E and/ or the Seller by a Bidder is limited to the Purchase Price for the relevant lot. Neither M&E nor the Seller shall be liable for any indirect or consequential losses.
(d) Nothing in Condition 4 shall exclude or limit the liability of M&E or the Seller for death or personal injury caused by the negligent acts or omissions of M&E or the Seller.
5. Bidding at Auction
(a) M&E has absolute discretion to refuse admission to the auction. Before sale, Bidders must complete a Registration Form and supply such information and references as M&E requires. Bidders are personally liable for their bid and are jointly and severally liable with their principal, if bidding as agent (in which case M&E’s prior and express consent must be obtained).
(b) M&E advises Bidders to attend the auction, but M&E will endeavour to execute absentee written bids provided that they are, in M&E’s opinion, received in sufficient time and in legible form.
(c) When available, written and telephone bidding is offered as a free service at the Bidder’s risk and subject to M&E’s other commitments; M&E is therefore not liable for failure to execute such bids. Telephone bidding may be recorded.
6. Import, Export and Copyright Restrictions M&E and the Seller make no representations or warranties as to whether any lot is subject to import, export or copyright restrictions. It is the Buyer's sole responsibility to obtain any copyright clearance or any necessary import, export or other licence required by law, including licenses required under the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).
7. Conduct of the Auction
(a) The auctioneer has discretion to refuse bids, withdraw or re-offer lots for sale (including after the fall of the hammer) if (s)he believes that there may be an error or dispute, and may also take such other action as (s)he reasonably deems necessary.
(b) The auctioneer will commence and advance the bidding in such increments as (s)he considers appropriate and is entitled to place bids on the Seller’s behalf up to the Reserve Price for the lot, where applicable.
(c) Subject to Condition 7(a), the contract between the Buyer and the Seller is concluded on the striking of the auctioneer's hammer.
(d) Any post-auction sale of lots shall incorporate these Conditions of Business.
8. Payment and Collection
(a) Unless otherwise agreed in advance, payment of the Purchase Price is due in pounds sterling immediately after the auction (the "Payment Date").
(b) Title in a lot will not pass to the Buyer until M&E has received the Purchase Price in cleared funds. M&E will generally not release a lot to a Buyer before payment. Earlier release shall not affect passing of title or the Buyer's obligation to pay the Purchase Price, as above.
(c) The refusal of any licence or permit required by law, as outlined in Condition 6, shall not affect the Buyer’s obligation to pay for the lot, as per Condition 8(a).
(d) The Buyer must arrange collection of lots within 10 working days of the auction. Purchased lots are at the Buyer's risk from the earlier of (i) collection or (ii) 10 working days after the auction. Until risk passes, M&E will compensate the Buyer for any loss or damage to the lot up to a maximum of the Purchase Price actually paid by the Buyer. M&E’s assumption of risk is subject to the exclusions detailed in Condition 5(d) of the Conditions of Business for Sellers.
(e) All packing and handling of lots is at the Buyer's risk. M&E will not be liable for any acts or omissions of third party packers or shippers.
9. Remedies for non-payment Without prejudice to any rights that the Seller may have, if the Buyer without prior agreement fails to make payment for the lot within 5 working days of the auction, M&E may in its sole discretion exercise 1 or more of the following remedies:-
(a) store the lot at its premises or elsewhere at the Buyer’s sole risk and expense;
(b) cancel the sale of the lot;
(c) set off any amounts owed to the Buyer by M&E against any amounts owed to M&E by the Buyer for the lot;
(d) reject future bids from the Buyer;
(e) charge interest at 8% per annum above Lloyds TSB Bank plc Base Rate from the Payment Date to the date that the Purchase Price is received in cleared funds;
(f) re-sell the lot by auction or privately, with estimates and reserves at M&E’s discretion, in which case the Buyer will be liable for any shortfall between the original Purchase Price and the amount achieved on re-sale, including all costs incurred in such re-sale;
(g) Exercise a lien over any Buyer’s Property in M&E’s possession, applying the sale proceeds to any amounts owed by the Buyer to M&E. M&E shall give the Buyer 14 days written notice before exercising such lien;
(h) commence legal proceedings to recover the Purchase Price for the lot, plus interest and legal costs;
(i) disclose the Buyer’s details to the Seller to enable the Seller to commence legal proceedings.
10. Failure to collect purchases
(a) If the Buyer pays the Purchase Price but does not collect the lot within 20 working days of the auction, the lot will be stored at the Buyer's expense and risk at M&E’s premises or in independent storage.
(b) If a lot is paid for but uncollected within 6 months of the auction, following 60 days written notice to the Buyer, M&E will re-sell the lot by auction or privately, with estimates and reserves at M&E’s discretion. The sale proceeds, less all M&E’s costs, will be forfeited unless collected by the Buyer within 2 years of the original auction.
11. Data Protection
(a) M&E will use information supplied by Bidders or otherwise obtained lawfully by M&E for the provision of auction related services, client administration, marketing and as otherwise required by law.
(b) By agreeing to these Conditions of Business, the Bidder agrees to the processing of their personal information and to the disclosure of such information to third parties world-wide for the purposes outlined in Condition 11(a) and to Sellers as per Condition 9(i).
12. Miscellaneous
(a) All images of lots, catalogue descriptions and all other materials produced by M&E are the copyright of M&E.
(b) These Conditions of Business are not assignable by any Buyer without M&E’s prior written consent, but are binding on Bidders' successors, assigns and representatives.
(c) The materials listed in Condition 1(a) set out the entire agreement between the parties.
(d) If any part of these Conditions of Business be held unenforceable, the remaining parts shall remain in full force and effect.
(e) These Conditions of Business shall be interpreted in accordance with English Law, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts, in favour of M&E.
Morton & Eden Ltd.’s Authenticity Guarantee
If Morton & Eden Ltd. sells an item of Property which is later shown to be a “Counterfeit”, subject to the terms below Morton & Eden Ltd. will rescind the sale and refund the Buyer the total amount paid by the Buyer to Morton & Eden Ltd. for that Property, up to a maximum of the Purchase Price.
The Guarantee lasts for two (2) years after the date of the relevant auction, is for the benefit of the Buyer only and is non-transferable. “Counterfeit” means an item of Property that in Morton & Eden Ltd.’s reasonable opinion is an imitation created with the intent to deceive over the authorship, origin, date, age, period, culture or source, where the correct description of such matters is not included in the catalogue description for the Property. Property shall not be considered Counterfeit solely because of any damage and/or restoration and/or modification work (including, but not limited to, traces of mounting, tooling or repatinating). Please note that this Guarantee does not apply if either:-
(i) the catalogue description was in accordance with the generally accepted opinions of scholars and experts at the date of the sale, or the catalogue description indicated that there was a conflict of such opinions; or
(ii) the only method of establishing at the date of the sale that the item was a Counterfeit would have been by means of processes not then generally available or accepted, unreasonably expensive or impractical; or likely to have caused damage to or loss in value to the Property (in Morton & Eden Ltd.’s reasonable opinion); or
(iii) there has been no material loss in value of the Property from its value had it accorded with its catalogue description.
To claim under this Guarantee, the Buyer must:-
(i) notify Morton & Eden Ltd. in writing within one (1) month of receiving any information that causes the Buyer to question the authenticity or attribution of the Property, specifying the lot number, date of the auction at which it was purchased and the reasons why it is believed to be Counterfeit; and
(ii) return the Property to Morton & Eden Ltd. in the same condition as at the date of sale and be able to transfer good title in the Property, free from any third party claims arising after the date of the sale.
Morton & Eden Ltd. has discretion to waive any of the above requirements. Morton & Eden Ltd. may require the Buyer to obtain at the Buyer's cost the reports of two independent and recognised experts in the relevant field and acceptable to Morton & Eden Ltd. Morton & Eden Ltd. shall not be bound by any reports produced by the Buyer, and reserves the right to seek additional expert advice at its own expense. In the event Morton & Eden Ltd. decides to rescind the sale under this Guarantee, it may refund to the Buyer the reasonable costs of up to two mutually approved independent expert reports, provided always that the costs of such reports have been approved in advance and in writing by Morton & Eden Ltd.
